UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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IVAN ANTONYUK; GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, INC.; GUN OWNERS FOUNDATION; and GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA NEW YORK, INC.,

Plaintiffs.

VS.

1:22-CV-734

KEVIN P. BRUEN, in his Official Capacity as Superintendent of the New York State Police,

Defendant.

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Transcript of a Motion Hearing held on
August 23, 2022, at the James Hanley Federal
Building, 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse,
New York, the HONORABLE GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief
Judge, Presiding.

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiffs:

STAMBOULIEH LAW, PLLC Attorneys at Law

P.O. Box 428

Olive Branch, Mississippi 38654 BY: STEPHEN D. STAMBOULIEH, ESQ.

For Defendant:

STATE OF NEW YORK

Office of the Attorney General

28 Liberty Street

New York, New York 10005

BY: JAMES M. THOMPSON, ESQ.

STATE OF NEW YORK

Office of the Attorney General

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

BY: MICHAEL G. McCARTIN, ESQ.

1 (Open Court, 10:38 a.m..)

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THE CLERK: Case is Ivan Antonyuk Gun Owners of America, Inc., Gun Owners Foundation and Gun Owners of America New York Inc. versus Kevin Bruen, 22-CV-734, Counsel, please note your appearances for the record.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Stephen Stamboulieh for the plaintiffs.

MR. THOMPSON: Good morning, your Honor, James
Thompson from the Attorney General's office for defendant
Bruen.

MR. McCARTIN: Good morning, your Honor, Michael McCartin with the Attorney General's office for defendant Bruen as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. We're here for a hearing this morning on the motion for preliminary injunction and we're going to -- we'll start with witnesses, then I'll give both parties an opportunity to make their arguments, certainly your arguments may be affected by some of the testimony that's elicited so we'll wait to hear any argument at the end, I think that makes the most sense. I'll give each of you an opportunity to present your arguments and then give a reply, so that you feel like you had an opportunity to cover everything, obviously an opportunity to respond to your opposing counsel. Okay?

So I think it makes the most sense, because our

4 technology has been a little iffy lately, technology's great 1 2 when it works, and so far we've got it working so this 3 witness that had travel issues and can't be here today, we're going to do remotely so why don't we call that witness first 4 and so that it can be addressed quickly and while we know it's working and then we'll go from there, okay? 6 7 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, sir. 8 9 MR. STAMBOULIEH: The plaintiffs will call Erich 10 Pratt, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. STAMBOULIEH: And your Honor, if it pleases the 13 court, my understanding of your order was that we would submit supplemental affidavits and then subject the witnesses 14 15 to cross-examination, so would the court like me to just authenticate he filed an affidavit and then have the state 16 17 cross-examine him? 18 THE COURT: Yeah, I mean I'm sure they'll 19 cross-examine him based on the affidavit that's been 20 submitted and whatever testimony you offer, so that's pretty 21 standard. 2.2 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes, sir, thank you. 23 THE COURT: No issues, all right? 24

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Thank you.

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THE COURT: So we'll swear him in.

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THE COURT: Okay.

rest on the declaration, I'll let my friends here cross.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: All right. Your Honor, we'll

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1 MR. McCARTIN: Thank you, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: When you're ready, sir, go ahead. 3 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. McCARTIN: Sir, good morning, my name's Michael McCartin, I 4 5 represent Superintendent Bruen in this litigation. Your organization, Gun Owners of America, is a 501(c)(4) 6 7 organization, is that correct? For Gun Owners of America, yes; we also have a 8 9 foundation as well. 10 And what is the foundation as far as, it's not a 11 501(c)(4), right? 12 That's correct, it's a 501(c)(3). 13 Now, as far as Gun Owners of America being a 501(c)(4), 14 that means your organization is an advocacy group, it lobbies 15 as part of its main core mission, is that correct? 16 That's correct. Α 17 And your whole purpose in being a political and 18 lobbying organization is to listen to your members and 19 advocate on their behalf to legislatures and courts for the 20 interest of the members, is that fair to say? 21 Α We do do that, and I would say organizationally, we 22 heard from an incredibly big number, large number of our 23 members on this way beyond anything that I can remember in 24 recent years, so we actually had to pull resources from what 2.5 we were currently doing --

- Q Sir, if I could ask you just to answer my questions
  before you get into that. Okay?
- 3 A Sure.
- 4 Q All right. Now, on page 1 of your website or a page of
- 5 your website for Gun Owners of America states, "Over the last
- 6 30 years, Gun Owners of America has built a nationwide
- 7 | network of attorneys to help fight court battles in almost
- 8 | every state in the nation to protect gun owners' rights," is
- 9 | that correct?
- 10 A That's correct.
- 11 | Q Now, last year your contributions were over \$6 million,
- 12 is that fair to say?
- 13 A I don't have that information in front of me, but -- so
- 14 | I can't, with, you know, willfully knowing what the number
- 15 | is, but it's certainly in the millions.
- 16 Q Now, you began to discuss the phone calls that you
- 17 | received. Is it correct that your organization Gun Owners of
- 18 | America received 28 telephone calls and e-mails in regard to
- 19 | the new legislation that we're addressing here today?
- 20 A That's correct.
- 21 Q How many phone calls on an average day would you
- 22 | normally have prior to July 1st of 2022?
- 23 A On any particular issue, you'd be able to count phone
- 24 calls that we would get on one hand.
- 25 Q And who answers the phones at your organization?

- 1 A We have several people who do.
- 2 Q And who are they?
- 3 A You're looking for names?
- 4 | O Yes.
- 5 A So we have Nico Gonzalez, we have Megan Browning who
- 6 | is -- heads up the team, and I can get you other names as
- 7 | well.
- 8 Q As a result of the passage of the CCIA, did you receive
- 9 an increase in the amount of e-mails or snail mail that you
- 10 received?
- 11 | A Yes, we certainly did, far exceeding anything that I
- 12 | can remember in recent years.
- 13 | Q Now when you say 28 calls and e-mails, is that combined
- 14 or individually?
- 15 A Could you clarify?
- 16 | Q Sure, I'm looking at paragraph 6 of your declaration
- 17 | and you indicate, "Relative to this issue, we received
- 18 | approximately 28 calls and e-mails." Is that 28 combined
- 19 | calls and e-mails?
- 20 A I guess I don't see -- I don't understand the
- 21 distinction between combined versus individually.
- 22 | Q Well, did you receive --
- 23 A There were 28 different people if that's what you mean.
- 24 | Q 28 different people contacted you?
- 25 | A Yes.

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1 Okay. Now, during the normal course of the day, prior 2 to July 1st of 2022, how many e-mails would your organization 3 generally get? Um, it really depends on what's happening but I would 4 5 say -- honestly I'd probably have to defer to Megan and get a statement from her because that's not something that I'm day 6 7 to day at all tracking. So you don't --8 9 But I'm quessing, I have in the past I will say -- I'm 10 not currently but in the past when I was more operationally 11 looking at that, I would say it would be like a dozen to 15 a 12 day. 13 Dozen to 15 a day. And in total, you received 28 calls and e-mails relative to this particular legislation? 14 15 That's correct. Right. And just for clarification, Α 16

A That's correct. Right. And just for clarification, the 12 to 15 of course would be, I mean, that could be, you know, membership question, something like that, these aren't necessarily people who are calling on an issue.

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Q Sir, did members of your organization contact you at an increased pace as a result of the Supreme Court's *Bruen* decision that was issued on June 23rd, 2022?

A Yes, it was certainly concentrated around the time of the passage.

Q Between the time period of June 23rd, 2022 and June 30th, 2022, how many phone calls and correspondence did

- 1 you receive in that one-week period?
- 2 A I don't have that information in front of me but that's

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- 3 | something that I can get.
- 4 | Q Did you continue to receive phone calls as a result of
- 5 | the legislation in question being signed into law on July 1st
- 6 of 2022?
- 7 A I don't know when, what day it began, what day the
- 8 calls and contacts began.
- 9 Q Your lawsuit in this case began on July 11, 2022,
- 10 | correct?
- 11 | A I'm assuming so, I don't have the document in front of
- 12 me.
- 13 Q Assuming that's correct?
- 14 A Sorry.
- 15 | Q Assuming that's correct, sir?
- 16 | A Okay.
- 17 Q Between the 1st of July and the 11th of July, how many
- 18 of the phone calls of the 28 phone calls and the e-mails did
- 19 | you receive in that 11-day period?
- 20 A Again, I don't have that information as to when the
- 21 | calls came, you know, on which days they came, I only know
- 22 the total numbers.
- 23 | Q How many more members did your organization obtain
- 24 | since July 1st of 2022?
- 25 A Again, that's not information that I have, but

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- 1 | certainly information that I can get.
- 2 Q Can you give me an estimate of how many more members
- 3 you obtained as a result of the act being passed?
- 4 A As we're -- as I'm sitting here, I cannot, because
- 5 again, that's, you know, I'm one who deals with the media and
- 6 so, you know, we have a lot of division of labor, that's just
- 7 | not something I deal with on a day-to-day basis.
- 8 Q How much more in donations did you receive between
- 9 July 1st, 2022, and this date?
- 10 A Again, I don't have that information, I can get it.
- 11 | can tell you how our media kicked up because that is what I
- deal with, and we were slammed with media and had several
- 13 | staffers having to handle media requests, so that I can say
- 14 definitely took an uptick.
- 15 Q Is it possible that your membership and contributions
- 16 took an uptick as well so you have a financial net benefit as
- 17 | a result of the act being passed?
- 18 A I can only speculate that's something that I can --
- 19 | again, that's information we can certainly get for you.
- 20 Q But you don't have it here today?
- 21 | A Nope, sorry, I don't.
- 22 | Q So you don't know if the act has been a financial boon
- 23 | to your organization as opposed to a detriment?
- 24 A Again, that's information that, you know, I'll have to
- 25 | check with our financial officer to find out what's been the

- 1 uptick in New York.
- 2 | Q Sir, you mentioned in your declaration that you had a
- 3 | concern about a gun show in Hamburg, New York, is that
- 4 | correct?
- 5 A That's correct.
- 6 Q Has that gun show been canceled to your knowledge?
- 7 A To my knowledge, no, although I believe that they are
- 8 very concerned about whether they can have it, so our
- 9 understanding is that it might be.
- 10 | Q It might be but you don't know if it has?
- 11 A I don't know for sure, no.
- 12 Q Has that gun show been threatened to be canceled by the
- 13 New York State Police, to your knowledge?
- 14 A I don't personally have that information.
- 15 Q Do you know if any members of either the Gun Owners of
- 16 | America or the Gun Foundation of America are former members
- 17 | of the New York State Police?
- 18 | A I personally don't have knowledge of that.
- 19 Q Other than through this lawsuit, has your organization
- 20 | had any contact with the New York State Police about the
- 21 | CCIA?
- 22 A Not that I know of.
- 23 | Q Has the New York State Police threatened you or your
- 24 organization with any consequences related to a violation of
- 25 | the CCIA?

13 Erich Pratt - Redirect Not that I've been made aware of. 1 2 MR. McCARTIN: Thank you, sir. Your Honor, I have 3 no other questions at this time, thank you. THE COURT: Any redirect? 4 5 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Just a brief redirect, your 6 Honor. 7 THE COURT: Go ahead, sir. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STAMBOULIEH: 8 9 Mr. Pratt, you heard my friend's questions about 10 whether or not the act was a financial boon to Gun Owners of 11 America and Gun Owners Foundation, do you recall that 12 question? 13 Α I do. 14 Do you pay your attorneys, Mr. Pratt? Q 15 Α Yes, we do. 16 Do you anticipate making more money in donations than 17 what you're going to pay me to litigate this case? 18 It has never been our experience that the contributions 19 coming in related to a case pay for the expenses of our 20 attorneys. 21 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Okay. Thank you so much. Thank 2.2

you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Any followup --

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MR. McCARTIN: I would just note, your Honor, that attorneys' fees aren't able to establish standing. Other

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DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STAMBOULIEH:

Q Mr. Robinson, will you state your name for the record,

please.

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William Robinson - Direct

- 1 | A William Robinson.
- 2 Q Mr. Robinson, did you execute an affidavit yesterday in
- 3 | this matter?
- 4 A Yes, I did.
- 5 Q Can I show you -- I don't have an exhibit to show you
- 6 but it's just this affidavit document.
- 7 May I approach, your Honor?
- 8 THE COURT: You may.
- 9 Q Is this your signature at the bottom of this document?
- 10 A Yes, it is.
- 11 Q And this is your affidavit, correct?
- 12 A Yes.
- 13 | Q Along with the exhibits attached, correct?
- 14 | A Yes.
- 15 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Okay, thank you. Your Honor,
- 16 | we'll rest on Mr. Robinson's declaration, tender him to the
- 17 | state.
- 18 THE COURT: Okay. Counsel.
- MR. McCARTIN: Thank you, your Honor.
- 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. McCARTIN:
- 21 | Q Good afternoon, sir, my name is Michael McCartin, I
- 22 represent Superintendent Bruen in this matter. Can you tell
- 23 | me again the name of your organization?
- 24 A It's Gun Owners of America New York.
- 25 | Q And is that a 501(c)(4) organization?

- 1 A (c)(3).
- 2 Q (c)(3). And does that mean that your organization is
- 3 | an advocacy group that deals with political and lobbying
- 4 organizations?
- 5 A We're a 501(c)(3) so technically we can't recommend
- 6 anybody to vote for, that type of thing. We do, our primary
- 7 | mission is to educate the public on gun laws, gun rights,
- 8 | Second Amendment issues.
- 9 Q And that is your primary mission, to advocate on behalf
- 10 of your members in legislatures and courts, is that fair to
- 11 say?
- 12 A Well, if we see something we're interested in or that's
- 13 going to violate our constitutional rights, yeah, we will
- 14 pursue that.
- 15 | Q Now how many phone calls did your organization receive
- 16 | as a result of the passage of the CCIA?
- 17 A Well, I'm not sure the figure I put down on the
- 18 | affidavit but 20, could be, right, since I did that actually
- 19 it's probably another three or four more so in the 20s.
- 20 | Q And how many phone calls would you get on an average
- 21 day at your organization prior to July 1st of 2022?
- 22 A Well, we don't -- I wouldn't say, a week, can I say
- 23 | weekly? Like three to four a week say. We didn't have a lot
- 24 of phone calls on, you know, only, as Erich Pratt said
- 25 | earlier, when things are hot, there's a serious concern of

- 1 our members, then I get the phone calls. I personally take
- 2 most of the phone calls.
- 3 Q Did you receive a number of phone calls as a result of
- 4 | the Supreme Court's decision on *Bruen*?
- 5 A Yes, received a number of them, positive phone calls,
- 6 people were really very happy that that happened.
- 7 | Q How many phone calls did you receive from June 23rd,
- 8 | the date of the issuance of the decision, until July 1st?
- 9 A I can't -- I'm sorry, I can't tell you, I'm not sure, I
- 10 | don't know.
- 11 Q Who answers the phones at your organization; was that
- 12 you?
- 13 A Pretty much, we have a 24-hour answering service,
- 14 | machine type of thing and it kicks into my cell phone.
- 15 Q So a lot of the phone calls that you received, in the
- 16 | 20s or so, went to your message machine, your voice mail?
- 17 A Well, it doesn't leave a message, it flips over right
- 18 | to my cell phone after a few calls -- few rings, then it
- 19 kicks into my cell phone.
- 20 | Q Okay. So did you answer all of those 20 or so phone
- 21 | calls?
- 22 A Eventually I did, yes, yeah.
- 23 Q Oh, so you would call them back?
- 24 A I tried to call most of them back, I'm still behind a
- 25 | couple.

- 1 | Q How many e-mails did you receive, after July 1st?
- 2 A Not sure I put on that document because I get them
- 3 | every day, a lot of e-mails, quite a few, dozens of them.
- 4 Q Dozens like 24?
- 5 A Yeah, something like that, I would say, related to ...
- 6 Q How many e-mails would you get in a normal day, prior
- 7 | to July 1st, 2022?
- 8 A Related to Gun Owners of America and gun material, not
- 9 that often, every -- well, two or three a day.
- 10 Q I want you to assume that the standing period is
- 11 between July 1st, the date of the act being passed, and the
- 12 | date of your lawsuit being July 11th, how many phone calls
- and e-mails did you receive in that 11-day period?
- 14 A I don't know. I can get back to you on it, I mean I
- 15 | think I can get back to you on it, but I'm not sure.
- 16 Q Did your organization gain additional funds as a result
- of having new members sign up with your organization and
- 18 | after July 1st, 2022?
- 19 A Well, looking back listening to Erich Pratt's interview
- 20 | earlier, the -- we did get a slight increase in membership,
- 21 | so we did get some positive, more members, we did get some
- 22 | more -- new signups but mainly the contributions we get from
- people because they're concerned about hiring the lawyers to
- 24 | go after these recent, you know, gun laws passed.
- 25 | Q I'm sorry, sir, I didn't mean to interrupt.

- A I was going to say so we got an increase on funding to hire lawyers to go after the suit regarding these new laws
- 3 passed, that was a big increase.
- 4 Q How much more of an increase in contributions did you
- 5 receive?
- 6 A Money wise I'm not sure, I'd have to get back to you on
- 7 | that but it was mainly notes, we have checks were sent in to
- 8 | hire attorneys to fight, you know, to fight the new gun laws,
- 9 | that's what was primarily the increase was. We did get some
- 10 | new members obviously and additional funding but -- does that
- 11 | answer your question or --
- 12 Q Well, let's focus first on the new members. About how
- 13 many more did you get?
- 14 A Maybe a dozen.
- 15 Q And the contributions, is it in the thousands of
- 16 | dollars in addition?
- 17 A Well, the thousands for to hire a lawyer, for lawyer
- 18 | fee.
- 19 Q Right, that's what I'm talking about.
- 20 A Legal action.
- 21 Q How much more did you receive in contributions since
- 22 | July 1st of 2022?
- 23 | A I can't give you the figure off -- I can just tell you
- 24 | that what I know and I'm fairly positive of is about -- over
- 25 | 5, \$6,000 we received for legal fees, to put towards legal

- 1 | fees, to hire an attorney.
- 2 Q Your declaration indicated that you spent about \$700 on
- 3 hotels, \$400 on gas and \$400 on meals?
- 4 A Yeah, that's correct.
- 5 Q But you've taken in thousands of dollars from
- 6 additional donations, right?
- 7 A For legal matters, yes.
- 8 Q So it's been, the act itself has been a net positive
- 9 | for you as far as your finances go, is that correct?
- 10 A Up to this point, so far, yes.
- 11 Q So the act being passed is a boon for your
- 12 organization, is that fair to say?
- 13 A Wouldn't call it a boon, it was money sent necessarily
- 14 | to make the rounds, as I say in that affidavit, to talk to
- 15 | groups of people throughout the state of New York, time,
- 16 | energy, gas, hotel bills, food, it was designed to shall we
- 17 | say strengthen our end, put together a team to go after these
- 18 | new gun laws, legally.
- 19 Q Now, your whole purpose in your employment with your
- 20 organization is to do that very thing, meet with members and
- 21 | explain to them what's going on in the gun world, is that
- 22 | fair to say?
- 23 A Yeah, yes.
- 24 | Q So that's your core mission, right?
- 25 A That's what I been doing as the communications

- 1 director, making the rounds.
- 2 Q So you haven't been diverted from your core mission,
- 3 | you've been doing your core mission, is that fair to say?
- 4 A For this specific thing I have been diverted, I haven't
- 5 | had to in the past run all over the state of New York to put
- 6 together this information and the concerns of gun owners
- 7 | throughout the state of New York. This is a heavy duty
- 8 problem to our gun owners.
- 9 Q Well, sir, you've told me that your core mission is to
- 10 do what you've been doing, is to go around the state --
- 11 A On --
- 12 Q -- and talk to your members?
- 13 A Of late.
- 14 Q And educate them on gun issues, is that fair to say?
- 15 A Of late, yeah, I've had to do that of late. Normally
- 16 | it's just Monroe County area out of, you know, e-mails, phone
- 17 | calls and our local meeting, GOA New York meetings in the
- 18 | greater Rochester area, so this is unusual for me to have to
- 19 be running all over the state of New York.
- 20 | Q But it's fair to say that every dime that you spent on
- 21 this, you've taken in a dollar, is that fair to say?
- 22 A I quess, it's off -- I'd have to think about that, but
- 23 | it sounds ... as far as taking in a dollar, would you explain
- 24 | that more?
- 25 Q Sure. You've taken in a lot more money than you've

William Robinson - Redirect

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- 1 | spent dealing with this act, fair to say?
- 2 A Up to this date, at this point, yes.
- MR. McCARTIN: Thank you, sir. I have no other
- 4 | questions. Wait, I just want to confer with counsel.
- 5 | THE COURT: Go ahead.
- MR. McCARTIN: No other questions, your Honor,
- 7 | thank you very much.
- 8 THE COURT: Any redirect?
- 9 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Brief redirect, your Honor.
- 10 THE COURT: Go ahead.

# 11 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. STAMBOULIEH:

- 12 | Q Mr. Robinson, you haven't paid your attorneys yet, have
- 13 you?
- 14 | A No.
- 15 Q Okay. And then one other question. Gun Owners of
- 16 | America New York, is that a sister corporation of Gun Owners
- 17 of America?
- 18 A No, it's strictly a separate corporation.
- 19 Q Okay. Just named kind of the same?
- 20 A We have worked together on projects.
- 21 Q But you're not affiliated with GOA or GOF?
- 22 A No, totally separate entity, separate corporation.
- MR. STAMBOULIEH: Okay, thank you so much.
- 24 THE COURT: Anything further on that?
- 25 MR. McCARTIN: No, your Honor, thank you.

- 1 | this document?
- 2 | A Yes, I do.
- 3 | Q And is this your signature on page 4?
- 4 A Yes, that is.
- 5 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Plaintiffs will rest on his
- 6 affidavit, your Honor.
- 7 THE COURT: Okay. Cross-examination?
- 8 MR. McCARTIN: Thank you, your Honor.
- 9 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. McCARTIN:
- 10 Q Morning, sir.
- 11 A Morning.
- 12 Q My name is Michael McCartin, I'm with the Attorney
- General's office and I represent Superintendent Bruen. What
- 14 | city do you live in, sir?
- 15 A Schenectady.
- 16 Q And have you ever been a trooper at any point in your
- 17 | past, New York State police officer?
- 18 | A No, I did not.
- 19 Q When did you obtain your concealed carry permit in
- 20 | New York?
- 21 A 2009.
- 22 | Q I'm sorry, could you repeat that?
- 23 A 2009.
- 24 Q 2009, thank you. And which county in New York issued
- 25 | your concealed carry permit?

- 1 A Schenectady.
- 2 Q Now, is it true that when you obtained your concealed
- 3 | carry permit in 2009, you had to fill out a concealed carry
- 4 | application, a PP3?
- 5 A Well, I don't remember the name or numbers of the forms
- 6 | but I paid all the regulations and requirements to obtain my
- 7 | pistol permit.
- 8 MR. McCARTIN: Your Honor, I wish to put Exhibit 1
- 9 on the ELMO if that's okay to show the witness?
- 10 THE COURT: Plaintiff's counsel has seen it?
- MR. McCARTIN: Yes, he has a copy.
- 12 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.
- 13 Q Sir, do you recognize that form PP3 just to be like the
- 14 | form that you filled out in 2009 for your concealed carry
- 15 | permit?
- 16 A Been awhile ago but looks familiar.
- 17 | Q Looks familiar to you?
- 18 A Correct.
- 19 Q Now isn't it true, sir, that in order to obtain your
- 20 | concealed carry license in 2009, you had to provide the
- 21 | issuing body with four character witnesses to vouch for
- 22 | your -- on your behalf?
- 23 | A Yes.
- 24 Q Now, there was nothing arduous about that for you, was
- 25 | there?

- 1 | A No.
- 2 Q The person that issued you a concealed carry license
- 3 | back in 2009 was a judge in Schenectady County, is that
- 4 | correct?
- 5 A Correct.
- 6 Q And it was not anyone dealing with the state police, is
- 7 | that fair to say?
- 8 A I would assume so.
- 9 Q Did you personally appear before that judge in his
- 10 | courtroom or her courtroom?
- 11 A I did not.
- 12 Q Sir, do you use your weapon only in a manner that does
- 13 | not endanger oneself or others?
- 14 A I'm safely carrying my gun when I'm allowed to, I'm
- 15 exercising my rights and also doing competition events and
- 16 | hunting and my -- always been concerned to do it safely and
- 17 | to do it by the law.
- 18 | Q Sir, since 2009, have you made it a regular practice to
- 19 | carry your concealed firearm onto the private property of
- 20 others even if you knew that they did not consent to you
- 21 | bringing your firearm on their private property?
- 22 A As of right now, I'm still allowed to carry my firearm
- 23 | if I'm going to the gas station, if I'm going to pick up my
- 24 | kids from their friends' houses, if I'm going to the stores
- 25 or pharmacy to pick up prescriptions for my children. I'm a

father, I'm a husband, so sometimes some requirements during
the day that I have to do, like I mentioned before, picking
up my kids, dropping my kids off --

Q Sir, I don't want to interrupt but you're drifting off from the question that I actually asked. Now if you know that somebody does not want you to have a firearm on their private property, do you still bring that firearm on their property?

A If somebody will have little sensitive case regarding a firearm, I will, just would not come over to this person's property if I'm not welcome there.

Q So would you therefore admit that if another man or woman does not want you to be armed with a firearm on their private property, that is something that you must honor?

A Correct.

Q You mentioned wanting to take the gun to your doctor's office. Do you know if your doctor wants you to take the gun onto his property or her property?

A I never knew any doctor that would require me not to carry the gun or to have any opinions regarding the firearms. I've never been approached with the question, I've never been approached with a requirement not to be able to bring the gun over. Beside my children's doctors or my own doctors, I also have a consulting business and some of my clients are doctors and anytime during the day or night, I can receive a phone

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call with system problems, I'm supporting IT environment, 1 2 that I have to come over right away to address one or another 3 issue with the systems, and like I mentioned before, I always try to carry to protect myself and protect my family. And as 4 of right now, I'm still allowed to bring my firearm to see my 6 clients, as I mentioned before, who is also in the health 7 care industry. Did you ever ask your doctor if your doctor wanted you 8 9 to be armed on his or her property? 10 I did not, but I do know some of my clients are hunters 11 and they know that I'm a gun owner and never had any issues 12 with that. 13 Now you mentioned in your declaration that you wanted to bring a gun to your church. Do you know if your church 14 15 wants guns on its property? 16 Again, I never been told that there's anybody, any 17 church have any issues with firearms, and I didn't see any 18 signs stating that I'm not allowed to bring the firearm. 19 as of right now, I want to say that I don't see nothing 20 prohibiting me to bring a firearm if I want to bring it to go 21 for service at the church but as of right now, I did not 22 bring any guns to the church. 23 You mentioned that you wanted to carry a gun into 24 Walmart --

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Correct.

Q -- firearm into Walmart. Do you know if Walmart wants
you to carry a firearm onto its property?

A Well, I didn't ask and as far as I know it's still
legal to carry and if I'm somewhere and my wife call me, ask
me to pick up some groceries or if I'm on the way to
somewhere and I have to do quick shopping, I would have to go
home to disarm or leave my firearm in the car, I would have

home to disarm or leave my firearm in the car, I would have

8 it on me safely and that's usually, absolutely one of my

concerns, to carry when I can and if I'm told not to, I will

leave the premise.

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Q Now you mentioned wanting to carry a firearm into a movie theater. Do you know if a movie theater that you go to wants you to have firearms on their property?

A As far as I know, some movie theaters have signs outside that will not -- ask you not to bring the guns over.

I'm not really a big movie goer because of not, you know, the diminished feeling of safety that I will get by going to a

movie theater without being able to protect myself.

Q Do you know if any of these groups or organizations, the doctor's office, Walmart, the movie theater, do you know

if any of them know that you're carrying a firearm on their

property?

23 A I know that physicians, some of my clients, they know

that I'm a gun owner, they know that I'm carrying, and they

25 | never stated any issues with that.

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- Q Is there any harm in you asking these individuals if you could carry on their property?
- 3 A Can you repeat the question, please?
- 4 Q Sure. Is there any harm to you to ask these
- 5 individuals if they want you carrying on their property?
- 6 A No, not really.
- 7 Q Would you ever go onto the private property of another
- 8 over their objection with you carrying a firearm?
- 9 A No, I will not.
- 10 Q Now isn't it true that you're up for recertification of
- 11 | your concealed carry license sometime around January of 2023?
- 12 A Correct.
- 13 Q Have you been recertified in the past every three years
- 14 | since 2009 when you first obtained your concealed carry
- 15 license?
- 16 A I did it once, I believe it's five years ago, I'm also
- 17 | required to recertify every five years.
- 18 Q Can you tell me what your recertification entails?
- 19 A I have to go to the website and put in any new firearms
- 20 on my license and take any firearms that are no longer
- 21 possessed or owned.
- 22 | O So what's the difference between a renewal of a
- 23 | license, carry license, and recertification, do you know?
- 24 A Well, by the new CCIA requirements, it will require to
- 25 | take additional safety courses, additional firearm training

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- 1 | at the fire range that I wasn't required to do before.
- 2 Q Are you aware that the state police has indicated that
- 3 for recertification, additional training is not necessary?
- 4 A No, I do not. The way the law is written, it's -- I'm
- 5 | not a lawyer, for me as not a lawyer reading these laws is
- 6 | really confusing.
- 7 | Q Have you ever been denied recertification of your
- 8 | license?
- 9 A No, I did not.
- 10 Q Have you taken any steps to apply for a concealed carry
- 11 license under the new provisions of the CCIA?
- 12 A No, not yet.
- 13 Q Other than through this lawsuit, have you had any
- 14 interactions with the New York State Police over the past
- 15 | three months?
- 16 A No.
- 17 Q Has any member of the New York State Police ever
- 18 | threatened you with arrest or prosecution?
- 19 A No.
- 20 MR. McCARTIN: Your Honor, I don't have any other
- 21 | questions. Thank you very much.
- MR. STAMBOULIEH: I have no followup, your Honor.
- 23 | THE COURT: Okay. Okay, sir, you can step down,
- 24 | thank you.
- 25 (The witness was excused.)

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MR. STAMBOULIEH: Your Honor, I don't see -- is 1 2 defendant Bruen here? 3 MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, we understood, as we said in our letter of last night, that Superintendent Bruen 4 was relieved of any requirement to be here based on a conversation with your chambers back in July. 6 7 THE COURT: I think you were told that was your decision. 8 9 MR. THOMPSON: Yes. 10 THE COURT: As to whether or not you had him attend 11 and apparently you made a decision that he's not here. 12 That's correct. MR. THOMPSON: 13 THE COURT: So --14 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Well, may I briefly just explain 15 to the court what I wanted to ask defendant Bruen, because I 16 think it's germane to the issue and it's something that I 17 wanted to ask, maybe like two minutes, Judge? 18 THE COURT: Well, you can certainly get into it in 19 your argument. 20 MR. STAMBOULIEH: That's fine. 21 THE COURT: And if you, you know, if you feel that 2.2 it's vital to your proof, you certainly could subpoena him 23 and I can adjourn the hearing to have him attend if you feel 24 that it's, you know, that critical to your proof. 2.5 MR. STAMBOULIEH: I'm not going to make the court

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do that, your Honor, and I don't think it's critical but I do
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      just want to make a few points.
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                THE COURT: Okay.
                                  Thank you.
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                MR. STAMBOULIEH:
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                THE COURT: Okay. And we'll allow you to do that.
      So any other witnesses other than --
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                MR. STAMBOULIEH: No, your Honor.
                THE COURT: -- the ones you've called?
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                MR. STAMBOULIEH:
                                  No, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Okay. And then we'll proceed to
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      argument in the manner I described. We'll give you an
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      opportunity to make your initial argument, let the defense
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      counsel respond, and then we'll go back and forth one more
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      time, shorter probably. But we'll hear you, okay?
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                MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes, sir. May I proceed?
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                THE COURT: You may proceed when you're ready.
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                MR. STAMBOULIEH:
                                  Thank you, your Honor.
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Your Honor, we're here today because New York did not like the Supreme Court's decision in *Bruen* and we know that they didn't like it because the Governor came out either the day of or the day after and made a bunch of statements that the Supreme Court was a politicized branch and just excoriated them. And then we have this law that was put in the day before July 1st, no public debate, no three day for the public to look at it, no comments accepted, and then

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passed the next day.

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It will fundamentally change and has fundamentally already affected the way that New York is issuing permits and the way that New Yorkers can carry and exercise their Second Amendment right which, as the Supreme Court held in *Bruen*, is a right, you know, you have a right to publicly carry a firearm.

So right now, as Mr. Antonyuk explained, he can go into Walmart, he doesn't need to ask permission before he goes in, he's not a prohibited person, and as long as they don't have a sign on the front of Walmart saying he can't carry, he's allowed to carry there, because it's a place that's open to the public. The same for his doctor's office clients. This bill will change it to where not even the doctor in charge of his own facility can carry a firearm and cannot authorize Mr. Antonyuk to carry a firearm in his premise. And it's like that for all kinds of different things. Like if there was a psychiatrist that had to deal with crazy patients, she or he wouldn't be able to carry in the health care provider location. GOA has a member who's an oral surgeon on Long Island, we spoke to him, he can't carry a firearm in his business after September 1st, and he can't authorize anyone to carry.

So the way that New York has gone about this, it's not that they're trying to protect private property rights,

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even where I live in Mississippi, Judge, it's you can carry except where you're not allowed to carry, right? So if I go into a building that has a no-gun sign, I know that I'm not welcome there with the firearm. If I decide that I want to take it off and go in, that's perfectly fine and it's my choice, just like it's the property owner's choice to disallow someone from carrying. But the state has taken away all of this and said, the default position is no carry unless specifically authorized to carry by the proprietor. So if the experience is anything like in any other state that I've been to, people aren't going to post signs saying this is Most places, if they don't want you to carry, will post a no-qun sign. It works everywhere else and there's no reason that New York should be different than all of the other places. Because it fundamentally eviscerates the right to publicly keep and bear arms when you have all of these places that are now off limits.

As Mr. Antonyuk said in his first declaration that was filed with this court, he's very concerned about having to disarm himself to simply go to a gas station. And what makes this law worse is, number one, he has to keep the gun in the car which they tell you, don't keep guns in your car because if the car gets stolen, now we've got a thief with a gun. The second thing is he has to unload his firearm which entails taking the ammunition out of it, racking the slide,

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taking the ammunition out of the chamber and then separating them, putting them in a lockbox. Well, that's great, I guess, but if I'm on the side of the road because the gas station won't let me carry there and let's say this gentleman over here, your security guard, sees me, you know, unholster my firearm and sees a man with the gun, the police are going to do something about that, I would think. So he's now increased his chances of having a negligent discharge because he's manipulating a firearm, it's not in a holster. So it just introduces all of these additional risks that don't need to be there. He's licensed, he's met all of the standards, and he should be able to carry in all of the places that he's allowed to carry.

I will say in Bruen and in Heller, and we briefed this in our reply, they listed a very narrow group of places that are the, quote, real sensitive places, the real sensitive locations, you know, government buildings, schools, but it's not all of these places. Like Times Square, it can't be a sensitive place and even the Supreme Court talked about, you know, the state of New York declaring Manhattan a sensitive place and that that wouldn't be allowed. And yet here we are, we're saying that all of Times Square is sensitive. It could that be Times Square is sensitive at certain times, but not all the time. For airlines they say you can't carry it in an airport and that, logically that

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might make sense but for people that travel with firearms, they have to go into the airport with a checked bag because the TSA requires you, when you're traveling with a firearm, to check it in a certain way. Can't carry it in an airport, Judge, if it's in my suitcase because I'm flying home, I'm committing a felony and felonies strip you of your constitutional rights to bear arms and there's no way to get around it except for a Presidential pardon.

Judge, we've offered, I think, we've totaled their briefing pages, both briefed 65 pages, we briefed a lot and I know that it's a lot for the court to go over, we filed at like 5:40 something last night. I'm happy to answer any questions the court has, but all of the arguments are contained in my brief so I don't want to waste the court's time, I'm certainly happy to answer any questions.

THE COURT: I would like you to address some of the standing issues that have been raised.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes.

THE COURT: Facial standing, particularly with regard to the memberships, the members within New York State, the different organizations that have been made a part of this suit.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes, sir, yes, sir. So in every other circuit except the Second Circuit, organizational plaintiffs have like representational standing. So the

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Second Circuit obviously holds that the organizations can't bring 1983 claims under, and the name of the case escapes me but it says that they can't bring 1983 claims, and that's fine because we've also brought the case under 1331 which gives the court jurisdiction to decide constitutional claims, and if we shoehorn that in with 2201, declaratory judgment act, then we can come to this court with constitutional claims that the organizational plaintiffs raise on behalf of their members that are not also Section 1983 claims, and I don't think that there's a standing problem if you look at it in the lens of 1331. Okay, I thought you were going to ask a question.

THE COURT: No, go ahead.

the question was address the facial challenge. These laws, they're not just a little unconstitutional or they're constitutional in some instances. They're unconstitutional across the board. Now I'll say, certain parts in there where they talk about the sensitive locations about the schools, Bruen and Heller said that, so you know, I'm not going to come in here and tell you that the court was wrong because that's what they said. I don't agree with it but that's what they said and that's what it is. But not every piece of educational property, that's obviously not a constitutional thing to say, well, they're teaching a class in this building

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right here so now it becomes educational property and it's a felony, it's a felony if you carry in that building.

One second. There's another section in here, it's -- I believe it's subsection S that talks about any gathering of individuals to collectively express their constitutional rights to protest or assemble. Judge, that could be anything. If we go outside and we're, quote, assembling, then neither one of us can carry a gun, and New York would make it a felony to do so. There's no way that that's constitutional.

But the same thing with, they keep putting in their brief that New York has a compelling interest to control crime. Sure, under the old Heller standard, we could get into the interest balancing by another name and that's what it is here is they're trying to say that we have a compelling interest. And I'll submit to the court this absurd example. If New York State's interest was so compelling to control crime, we could set up a federal roadblock right here on the interstate and stop every single car and maybe catch a couple people with drugs in their car and they'll say, but we found drugs, and therefore it's constitutional because facially, you have to prove that it's unconstitutional in every circumstance, and I don't think that's what the law says. We could all agree that if we set up a roadblock right here on this road just to check to see if people had drugs in their

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car, we would be violating a whole host of constitutional provisions and it shouldn't be any different with the Second Amendment.

So when we look at these provisions that say that we're not allowed to assemble together and have a firearm, and that's where the gun show comes in, that's what Mr. Pratt and Mr. Robinson were talking about, we don't know if these qun shows now are going to be gun-free zones and it seems absurd that we're even talking about a gun show being a gun-free zone but people are assembling, right, they're exercising their Second Amendment right, they're exercising their First Amendment right and this makes it a felony, Judge. And a lot of these, and we've briefed them extensively, about which ones are addressed by Bruen and Heller, and which ones are like wholly unsupported by the analogues that the state has put up. And I don't envy the state having to defend this because it's so bad and they have to rely on really old, really racist and unconstitutional things that we would look at today. When good moral character was used in the 1800s to stop Black people from being members of the bar, or to talk about the good moral character of a slave so we could see that they were docile individuals and not prone to running away. This is the kind of stuff that's been put in this law. Not by name, they're of course not going to admit to it, but the analogues that

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they show point to this and the analogues that we've put up point to this being only justifiable if you look at saying we can ban Catholics from owning guns because they might be subversive or we think that they have bad moral character because they're unrepentant papists, and it's just all of this stuff, all of it.

So I hope I've addressed your question, your Honor, I will end with this. To the extent that there's any issue that the court perceives that doesn't like what our standing, whatever it is, all we ask is that we be allowed to amend prior to September 1st. It's easily correctable in an amended complaint, we'll sue everybody if we have to. I mean, this issue is very, very important, and we'll be happy to amend.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Defense counsel.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, your Honor, James
Thompson from the Office of the Attorney General for
defendant Bruen. Figured you'd like me over here.

THE COURT: Wherever you like as long as I can hear you.

MR. THOMPSON: So I have a whole spiel here but Mr. Stamboulieh cut his down, I'll do everyone the benefit of cutting mine down as well.

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THE COURT: You cover the points you need to cover. We're not -- I'm not worried about the time you spend, go ahead.

MR. THOMPSON: Yes, sir, your Honor. I think the place to start is with Judge Amy Coney Barrett in Kanter v. Barr, who wrote, "History is consistent with common sense: It demonstrates that legislatures have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns." In Kanter, Judge Barrett surveyed early American legal history and concluded that in order to disarm a dangerous person, the government should have "evidence that he either belongs to a dangerous category or bears individual markers of risk." The measures that the plaintiffs are trying to eliminate today are the ones that allow us to determine whether there are in fact those individual markers of risk for someone who wants to have a gun.

In this facial challenge, the plaintiffs want the court to make it impossible to conduct the assessment that Judge Barrett found so critical. The Supreme Court majority in Bruen acknowledged both the importance and the constitutionality of this analysis. Pointing out that there is nothing wrong with "shall-issue" licensing laws that have discretionary criteria so long as they "are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, law-abiding responsible citizens."

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I'd like to talk a little bit about good moral character because that's something that Mr. Stamboulieh has focused on. The plaintiffs have never, not once addressed the good moral character standard as it actually appears in the CCIA. They didn't in their briefing, they didn't in their reply, and didn't in the discussion right now. It's not just good moral character in general. The CCIA says that it means "having the essential character, temperament, and judgment necessary to be entrusted with a weapon and to use it only in a manner that does not endanger oneself or others." And plaintiffs —

THE COURT: Can I interrupt you for a second right there?

MR. THOMPSON: Of course, your Honor.

THE COURT: You point to that language and you refer to the Connecticut statute that it was modeled after. Explain to me how someone's going to carry a gun and not endanger themselves or someone else when the purpose of that is self-defense, in most circumstances that you would have a gun. I have some problems with that language.

MR. THOMPSON: Well, I think endanger oneself or others is understood to mean outside of the self-defense situation. We -- there are many laws that have that standard in, you know, being a danger to oneself or others and that's not something that's as applied involves self-defense. You

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know, for instance, mental hygiene laws talk about somebody being a danger to themselves or others, we would never say that somebody is subject to the mental hygiene law because they engaged in lawful self-defense.

THE COURT: Okay. So you're saying that the language assumes that self-defense is permitted.

MR. THOMPSON: I think that, I think that's true and I think that language, endangering oneself or others or being a danger to oneself or others, that's a standard that's well known in the law and it speaks to a person's dangerousness and a person's unreasonable dangerousness. And that's something that the plaintiffs have never acknowledged.

THE COURT: Okay. But we're -- you're talking about two different things. The good moral character standard within the statute and then the prohibition against how someone's supposed to use that weapon or what's the appropriate use for someone carrying a weapon. In my view.

MR. THOMPSON: I'm sorry, your Honor, can I ask you to explain the question a little more, I'm not sure I'm following you.

THE COURT: I'm saying there's two different things you're pointing to, the good moral character standard where you're trying to say, you know, we want people of good moral character and not dangerous-type people as opposed to the use of a weapon and how the statute and that language is written,

you know, and the language that I pointed out saying that it 1 2 cannot be used in a manner that was going to endanger 3 yourself or other people. Self-defense necessarily endangers 4 somebody. 5 MR. THOMPSON: I think that's true, but I think 6 that the standard being a danger to oneself or others does 7 not --THE COURT: Prohibit? 8 9 MR. THOMPSON: -- prohibit lawful self-defense. 10 think, and obviously if we had a standard that prohibited 11 lawful self-defense, you know, we would have a profound 12 Second Amendment problem. 13 THE COURT: Okay. You're saying that language does 14 not present that problem. 15 MR. THOMPSON: I think no. When we talk about 16 being a danger to oneself or others, you talk about being an 17 affirmative danger, not a reactive danger to someone else who 18 is a danger to you. 19 Thank you, sir, go ahead. THE COURT: 20 MR. THOMPSON: Of course. 21 THE COURT: Sorry to interrupt, get back to your 2.2 argument. 23 MR. THOMPSON: No, no, no, please, I'm here to 24 answer your questions. 2.5 So the plaintiffs never engage on the dangerousness

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standard and that's critical because that's what ties this law into the history. They talk about the standard as vague or open-ended or entirely discretionary but it's not. It's tied directly to indicators of violence and that's consistent with American history, which is full of examples of laws attempting to disarm persons who would be dangerous to others or to society.

This is a facial challenge to a statute enacted by the legislature which requires the plaintiffs to show clear likelihood of success on the merits and that there is no set of circumstances where these statutes could be constitutional. And that's something I believe

Mr. Stamboulieh agreed with when he was up. Under that standard, there is no possible likelihood of success in plaintiff's challenge to laws protecting people from guns in vulnerable places which are presumptively lawful. As Justice Scalia said in Heller and as Justice Thomas reiterated in Bruen, "We are also aware of no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such prohibitions."

And you heard from the plaintiffs that they agreed that some of the places are constitutional, some of them they disagree with. That is the definition of a statute that has a plainly legitimate sweep. We may disagree with how broad the legitimate sweep of the statute is and that's something that should be adjudicated in as-applied challenges down the

line.

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Similarly, on private property, laws prohibiting the carrying of guns on private property without an owner's consent are deeply rooted in American history and doctrine going back to the 18th century. We believe that the Supreme Court meant what it said in Bruen, we believe that the "shall-issue" state laws that the Supreme Court said were constitutional are constitutional and that's why New York CCIA was based on that. And we believe that the Bruen test of history and doctrine, fairly applied, will show that the CCIA should be upheld.

THE COURT: On that particular point, on private property, your statute flips the responsibility and says that, you know, the property owner now has to post explicitly guns are allowed or else they're prohibited. Address that.

MR. THOMPSON: First I would say that it doesn't say that the private property owner has to post that guns aren't prohibited, any form of express consent is sufficient under the statute. I think you're right that it puts the default that guns are not allowed unless the private property owner has consented, but there's nothing ahistorical about that and we cite a number of statutes from American history on that point. Pennsylvania 1721, "If any person or persons shall presume to carry any gun or hunt on the improved or inclosed land of any plantation other than his own, unless he

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have license or permission from the owner of such lands or plantation," he commits a crime.

New Jersey, 1771, "If any person or persons shall presume to carry any," there's an ellipsis in here, "to carry any gun on any lands not his own and for which the owner pays taxes or is in his lawful possession, unless he hath license or possession in writing from the owner or owners or legal possessor, every person so offending and convicted thereof shall," have a crime. And that New Jersey statute, if the violators were not from New Jersey, that's very much a helper statute, but if the violators were not from New Jersey, they were required to forfeit his or their gun or guns.

Texas, 1866, "It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to carry firearms on the inclosed premises or plantation of any citizen without the consent of the owner or proprietor."

Oregon, 1893, "It shall be unlawful for any person other than an officer on lawful business being armed with gun, pistol, or other firearm to go or trespass upon any enclosed premises or lands without the consent of the owner or possessor thereof."

So this is a statute that is deeply rooted to

American history. Private property rights are fundamental under the Constitution. And I would refer your Honor to the GeorgiaCarry case out of the 11th Circuit because it really

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is right on point here and does a very thorough historical analysis of its own. The statute there goes far beyond what New York statute did. It requires the gun holder to affirmatively go up to the management of, in this case the church, notify such security or management personnel of the presence of the weapon or long gun and then explicitly follow the security or management personnel's direction for removing, securing, storing, or temporarily surrendering such weapon or long gun. New York's statute does not put any such burden on that. You — it is satisfied so long as there is the consent of the property owner or the lessee.

And as you heard my colleague speak with Mr. Antonyuk, it does no harm to the gun holder to ask if the -- if he should be permitted to carry a gun onto a property that he's intending to go onto. And it allows the private property owner to make an informed decision about whether he wants not just the person but the person's gun on his property. And I think that is entirely reasonable and entirely consistent with both history and the *Bruen* text.

THE COURT: But isn't there a new requirement within this statute that specifically puts the onus that the property owner is going to post that guns are allowed, otherwise the gun owner has to assume that they're not?

MR. THOMPSON: The statute says that there can be a sign or there can otherwise be express consent. So it

doesn't have to be a sign. If Mr. Antonyuk has spoken with some of his medical clients and he understands that they know that he carries a gun and that they have no problem with that, then of course he would be able to go on to their premises because he has their consent. No sign required. And so no, it's not a sign requirement, it's a consent requirement.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. THOMPSON: Your Honor, if I could take a step back and talk a little bit about the issues of standing and justiciability. On the organizational standing point, I want to refer you to a very recent Second Circuit case,

Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc. v. Lamont, 6 F.4th 439, the relevant portion of it is 447 through 48. This case is almost exactly on point. It's, the Connecticut governor enacted a COVID-related measure that the plaintiff organization felt was violative of the Second Amendment.

They filed a lawsuit. And the Second Circuit held that there wasn't standing even though the organization had had to talk to its members and file a lawsuit and lobby the governor, because that's what the organization did. That's the definition of what an interest or advocacy group does.

And you heard from Mr. Pratt and Mr. Robinson that this is part of the core mission of these groups, including to engage in litigation. Similarly, I would point to Lawyers

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Committee for 9/11 Inquiry, Inc. v. Garland, this is a very recent case, it is reported but it's only on Westlaw right now so it's 2022 WL 3130649, and that's for the proposition that voluntary litigation activity does not confer organizational standing. That's an affirmative choice that organizations make.

As to the plaintiff's argument that they may not be able to have organizational standing under 1983 claims but they have a free standing constitutional claim, as I'm sure your Honor deals with quite regularly, Section 1983 is the exclusive constitutional remedy for a claim that a state actor has violated the Constitution, and for that we would cite Marino v. CUNY, 18 F.Supp.3d 320 at 341 and that cites to a number of controlling precedents as well. So I think as a matter of law there's no organizational standing.

I think there's also no organizational standing as a matter of fact. You heard from Mr. Pratt that he didn't know if there had been a gain or loss to the gun owners based on their work on the CCIA. And you heard Mr. Robinson say that they had a big increase in contributions. So I think certainly at the preliminary injunction stage, and standing is something on which the plaintiffs bear the burden, I think there's not a factual record to find it.

Moving beyond organizational standing, there's no traceability here. You've heard from each of the witnesses,

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no one has been contacted by the state police, no one has been threatened by the state police, there's no allegation that any plaintiff will imminently suffer any injury traceable to Superintendent Bruen. The same analysis gives rise to an Eleventh Amendment issue, because "a state official's duty to execute the laws is not enough by itself to make that official a proper party in a suit challenging a state statute," that's a quote from the Citizens Union case, 2017 WL 2984167, at \*4. And there's been no specific enforcement connection or activity alleged, let alone established, for preliminary injunction purposes between Superintendent Bruen and any of the CCIA provisions being challenged here.

Now plaintiffs do point out that the CCIA does have some aspects in which the state police is involved, including setting up an appeals board and querying the National Instant Background Check database, but none of the provisions in which the state police are involved are the provisions that the plaintiffs claim are going to harm them, and so there really is no connection here.

Now there is obviously a big elephant in the room which is that Superintendent Bruen was in fact the defendant in *Bruen*, has his name on it. But that was a case in which he was not the only defendant, he was also, he had a co-defendant who was the Rensselaer County judge who had in

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fact denied pistol permits of the plaintiffs. So this issue was not raised in that case and it would, wouldn't have made a dime's worth of difference, just we would be talking about the *McNally* standard instead of the *Bruen* standard which might actually relieve some of our confusion, but it wouldn't make a difference on the legal end.

In terms of the plaintiff Antonyuk, as he said, he's not required to renew his license and the interview social media disclosure and training requirements only apply when the license is issued or renewed. That's from Penal Law 400.00(1). All plaintiff Antonyuk has to do is recertify his license which as he said on the stand just involves going to a website, updating his contact information, updating his list of guns and affirming that he's not disqualified from owning a gun. So these -- these aspects of the law that he's challenging are not going to be applied to him and that's fatal to standing.

THE COURT: Aren't the private property regulations that are in the new statute, they're going to apply to him?

MR. THOMPSON: I think we would concede that at some point, Mr. Antonyuk is going to go on private property and so that would apply to him. I don't think that there's anything before your Honor indicating that that is traceable to the state police, and your Honor in your text order pointed to the amended complaint in the *Libertarian Party* 

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case which had a number of allegations about the statutory duty to enforce the laws, actions that the state police had taken related to enforcing gun laws and that in and of itself was not enough, as the Second Circuit held, to confer standing against Superintendent D'Amico it was at that point or any of the other state officials that were sued in that case. So there's no traceability, there's no -- you know, there's no injury in fact, there's no imminent threat of enforcement from the state police, as you've heard, and I think there's just no standing here, either for the organizational plaintiffs or for Mr. Antonyuk. In the event that the CCIA is applied against them in an unconstitutional manner, they will have the opportunity to challenge that, of course, and under an as-applied challenge, but there's just no threat that would give rise to a claim here.

THE COURT: So it's your position they would need to refile after September 1?

MR. THOMPSON: I -- no, I think they would need to refile after being threatened with some sort of imminent harm, and the mere enactment of the statute doesn't do that. Some sort of imminent threat of enforcement is what's required.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: Moving on very briefly, we talked about the facial challenge standard, I don't think that's

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seriously disputed, the plaintiffs dropped a footnote in their reply saying you don't have to apply it, I don't think that that's supported by the law and so really what has to be proven here is that there is no legitimate — there is no potentially constitutional application of any of these statutes and I don't think that that's supported, either by the history or by the doctrine.

And we discussed good moral character, we discussed how it is similar to other licensing laws that were deemed "shall-issue", not just that Connecticut law. Pennsylvania: Whether the applicant's character and reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety. Virginia: If the applicant is likely to use a weapon unlawfully or negligently to endanger others. Colorado: If the sheriff has a reasonable belief that documented previous behavior by the applicant makes it likely that the applicant will present a danger to self or Illinois: If the applicant does not pose a danger to himself, herself, or others as determined by the concealed carry licensing review board. Rhode Island statute that the Supreme Court discussed just says that, "that he or she is a suitable person to be so licensed." And the Supreme Court found that even that was technically "shall-issue" because a "demonstration of a proper showing of need is not a part of it." The Supreme Court said that, "Nothing in our analysis

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should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of these laws," and that's why it made perfect sense for New York to take its standard from these laws, and have a standard that involves character as linked to dangerousness.

We go through our historical analysis in some We talk about four categories of statutes: Colonial detail. laws on dangerous groups, Revolutionary era loyalty laws, militia mustering laws, and Reconstruction era licensing The plaintiffs like to chide us for the idea that some of, some of the Colonial era laws are based in racial or religious animus and that is in fact true. As Judge Barrett wrote in Kanter, these laws were adapted to the fears and threats of the time and place. Obviously such laws would not be constitutional today, as we say in our brief, they would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. That said, what they do stand for is the idea that there was a concern about dangerousness, and that there could be an individual and at some times a group determination of dangerousness made. will say that your defense counsel are both, as they say, unrepentant papists, we would not say that such laws would be constitutional now, but that was, when we look to what the understanding was, the public understanding was in 1791, sometimes the public understanding is going to be something other than what it would be in 2022. And sometimes that's for the best and sometimes that's for the worst.

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clear-eyed look at history is what the *Bruen* case requires of us, and so that's what we've given you.

Similarly, we talk about Revolutionary era loyalty laws. There is this fanciful passage in the plaintiff's moving brief where they talk about William Floyd, signer of the Declaration of Independence, talking to a British licensing officer and how that would never happen. In fact it was the Continental Congress in 1776, including presumably Mr. Floyd, they did it in March 1776, I know he was on it in July but I would assume he would be there in March as well. That directive states to go and find people who were disaffected to the present government of America and make sure they appeared in person, made an oath of loyalty, and if they didn't or couldn't or wouldn't, make sure that they would be disarmed so that they would not be a danger.

Militia mustering laws similarly, we discussed militia laws extensively in the training section but it's relevant here as well. Every male citizen, every white male citizen between 18 and 45 was required to muster multiple times a year and drill and if you show yourself unfit at that time, you would be court martialed and you would have your guns taken away at least on a temporary basis.

And then we discuss Reconstruction era licensing laws from around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, including New York City's which is right on point. It's from

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1878, so ten years after Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.

And we similarly cite to the Patrick Charles book Armed in

America which has an extensive list of such laws.

So we would say that they, these laws are deeply rooted in American history and doctrine, they allow for individualized assessment of dangerousness as Justice -- or Judge Barrett as she was then said in Kanter. The plaintiffs take a different view. They argue in their brief that, "The Second Amendment's plain text protects the right of the people to bear arms in public without having to demonstrate anything to the government or obtain anything from the government such as approval or a license." And there are some italicized points in there. That's just manifestly wrong under Bruen. The majority says, "Again, to be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 states 'shall-issue' licensing regimes." Justice Alito in his concurrence says, "Our ruling decides nothing about who may lawfully possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met to buy a qun, nor have we disturbed anything that we said in Heller or McDonald about restrictions that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns." And Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Roberts likewise say, "The court's decision does not prohibit states from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-defense." That's what New York does, that's what 43

other states do, and I suspect the other six as well.

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I won't go too deep into the discussion of social media because the plaintiffs didn't but it falls under the same individualized assessment of dangerousness. Obviously no one had Facebook in 1791. But these historical laws do stand for the proposition that the state can and should and must try to figure out whether there is an individualized The Bruen decision talks about indicia of dangerousness. background check. Similarly Justice Kavanaugh, writing for himself and Chief Justice Roberts, talks about fingerprinting and background check and mental health records check. Fingerprinting and mental health records checks also did not yet exist in 1791. And as we point out and I know that in discussing the plainly legitimate sweep, there are certainly instances where, and here in the third decade of the 21st century, where the individual indicia of dangerousness will be present on social media. We show a couple of them from the Robb Elementary shooting report, from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement report on the Parkland shooter, and although I know your Honor accepted it only for the purposes of the public interest prong, the amicus brief of Professor Schildkraut essentially is a broader and deeper analysis going into about 20 pages what we go into in two and including far more examples of disturbing instances of social media postings prior to violence.

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THE COURT: Okay, but I'd like you to address the issue that you're putting the onus on the gun-carrying applicant to disclose their social media accounts or postings. Is there any such correlation in the historical record? You know, there's an argument that it would be equivalent that you apply for a pistol permit, you'd have to turn over written correspondence, if you want to talk historically, and the First Amendment issues that have been raised by plaintiffs in that regard. I'd like you to address that because this is new and different with regard to the statute and it's certainly a law or regulation that states that the state has the ability and should be authorized to do a search of social media would be one thing, but to ask an applicant to affirmatively turn over correspondence, what's the basis for that?

MR. THOMPSON: Sure, your Honor. I think there's two parts to that question, let me take on the first part first. In terms of historic analogues, Bruen requires a historical analogue, it doesn't require a historical twin. So obviously we don't have any statutes before you that discuss, you know, please show us your anonymous pamphlets, but what we do have is a long history and tradition saying where there are indicia of dangerousness, individual elements of risk as Justice -- as Justice Barrett said, that is something that state should be able to take into mind in

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determining whether someone is too dangerous to have a gun.

And I think as a practical matter, postings on social media
are very relevant to that.

Now, you know, you say that it would be different if there was a search that was authorized versus having to disclose it. I think that's relevant to the First Amendment issue; I'm not sure that it is to the Second Amendment issue. I think the Second Amendment issue is about history and it's about dangerousness.

So with that, let me pivot to the First Amendment discussion, and here, and this is something that Mr. Stamboulieh I think conflated, here we are back in traditional intermediate scrutiny which still governs for First Amendment purposes. And the social media requirement is content neutral. I know the plaintiffs dispute that. a regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages, but not others. it's only people -- it's only gun license applicants that have to disclose their social media but the purpose is not geared toward that. The purpose is geared toward public safety. So to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the disclosure requirement must advance important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those

interests.

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I think the first part of that test is pretty straightforward. There's absolutely a compelling public safety and crime prevention goal in gun licensing and that is something that was held by the Second Circuit in NYSRPA v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 261 and a number of other cases that we cite. So it's really a question about the fit under intermediate scrutiny. And under intermediate scrutiny, the fit between the challenged regulation and the government interest need only be substantial, not perfect. So there is no requirement that in order to pass First Amendment scrutiny that the law must follow the least restrictive means possible.

Your Honor talks about, raises the issue of anonymous speech. I don't think that any plaintiff has raised that. Mr. Antonyuk has not alleged that he has any anonymous social media accounts, none of the declarations submitted by any of the organizational plaintiffs talk about them having anonymous social media accounts so I don't think it's properly before the court. But what I would say is that we believe that the law is narrowly tailored within the intermediate scrutiny framework. It's limited to a list of former and current social media accounts from the past three years and the use of those accounts is tied to the good moral character standard and the dangerousness element of it. And

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the Second Circuit in Libertarian Party previously indicated that there is a plainly legitimate sweep there. Thev said that examples of the sound application of the standard, "are not beyond an ordinary person's comprehension nor are they rare." And the Libertarian Party case also gives examples like for instance if there have been threats made, specific threats made of a person or indicators that a person has been significantly intoxicated while carrying a firearm. could imagine similarly if there were those same threats or those same indicia on social media, I think it absolutely would be a constitutional application and for the purpose of this facial challenge, that's enough. If it's entirely -- if it were to be applied in an unconstitutional manner against an individual plaintiff, that may give rise to an as-applied challenge down the line, but here there is a plainly legitimate sweep.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you envision in the permit process that certain people making the application may take the Fifth with regard to their social media account?

MR. THOMPSON: That's an interesting hypothetical.

THE COURT: Because what you're asking them to do is basically turn over all of my correspondence for the state's review to find possibly dangerousness, and somebody's going to read those presumably and make a determination which may open them up possibly to some type of prosecution.

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There's all sorts of interesting things that you're opening up here with that sort of requirement. Which is why I say it seems to me that the state's interest would have been, we have the authority to check, as opposed to asking an applicant to turn over their social media accounts.

MR. THOMPSON: I think the question is -- well, let me -- two answers to that question, let me do the first one first?

THE COURT: You got it, go ahead.

MR. THOMPSON: There are, there is a case where there have been a number of hypotheticals put out, by Mr. Stamboulieh, by us, and by your Honor, and again we come back first to the facial standard. If there is a plainly legitimate sweep here, and there is, then at this stage it is constitutional facially. Now if that hypothetical came to pass that someone took the Fifth, I think that would be a very interesting case to litigate in front of your Honor. As you know, taking the Fifth can give rise to a civil inference but I don't even want to speculate. I think that's a very interesting case that could happen in the future but it's not one that's presented here, it's not one that really matters to the facial challenge to the statute.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. THOMPSON: As to sensitive places, I won't go too far into what we've already said. There is I think an

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agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants that at least some of these sensitive places are constitutional. That is a plainly legitimate sweep for the purpose of the facial analysis and we've -- beyond that, I'll rely on our brief in terms of the historical statutes and analysis that we've cited.

Private property we've discussed. We have a number of historical analogues, and again I refer, I would refer your Honor to the *GeorgiaCarry* case. And in terms of the challenge to training requirements, as we went into some great historical detail on and if your Honor's interested in jumping down a rabbit hole, you can take a look at Friedrich von Steuben's Regulations for the Troops of the United States that talk about what actually goes into militia training or went into militia training at that time, in 1791 and after. All of us, with the exception of your Honor because judicial officials were exempted, would be meeting multiple times a year and spending hours on mandatory training and be potentially punished criminally or by court martial if we didn't.

THE COURT: You want to address the argument that it's particularly arduous to try and dissuade people from their constitutional right to carry?

MR. THOMPSON: I'm not sure if I understand, who is dissuading?

THE COURT: The applicant.

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MR. THOMPSON: I don't think that there's any effort here to dissuade anyone from the constitutional right to carry. I think that there is a training requirement in order to make sure that, in order to make sure that the applicant is capable of effectively handling a firearm. I think that training requirements are deeply rooted in American law and New York's training requirements are not dramatically out of step with other states as we point out. I don't think there's any dissuading going on.

THE COURT: Your position is that it's not particularly arduous in comparison to other training requirements in other states?

MR. THOMPSON: I think that's our position. It's also not particularly arduous in terms of the amount of hours or in terms of the amount of cost. Again, this is a requirement that applies only when a license is issued or renewed. So it's something that you have to do in Mr. --well, not in Mr. Antonyuk's case but in the case of another Schenectady County resident, it's something that you have to do once. If you're a resident of New York City, Nassau, Westchester, or Suffolk, it's something that you have to do when you first apply and then on the first renewal and after that you only recertify. So I think, you know, if you're talking about hours, it's, you know, 16 hours once or 16

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hours twice over a period of three to five years. I don't think that is unconstitutionally onerous.

And similarly, in terms of any costs, first of all, those costs are not imposed by the state police, they're imposed by localities or private trainers, and I think under the *Kwong* case, *Kwong v. Bloomberg*, although Mr. Stamboulieh is correct as he pointed out that that was decided under the pre-Bruen standard, I don't think that there is an unconstitutionally onerous burden from the training requirements.

And so your Honor, if you have no further questions, we believe that under the *Bruen* standard, CCIA's constitutional and the preliminary injunction motion should be denied. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. And the reply, I'm going to limit parties just because of the time.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If 15 to 20 minutes is sufficient for you to cover --

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Yes.

THE COURT: -- let's try and shoot for that mark.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Sure, yes.

THE COURT: You can go a little over, but I don't know that everybody wants to be here all day.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: Right, right, sir, of course.

May I proceed?

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THE COURT: You may.

MR. STAMBOULIEH: So there's just a couple things that I want to point out that probably demonstrate to the court how confusing this new law is.

So your Honor mentioned something about carrying in a medical provider's, health provider's location and my friend over here talked about, well, you just need to have consent, it's not a matter of being prohibited. If we read the statute though, the statute eliminates the ability to carry into a -- one second, just want to make sure I get it right. Any location providing health, behavioral health, or chemical dependence care or services. There's nothing that anyone that owns one of these providers can post a sign saying that someone else can carry and that's what I said at the beginning of my argument. Mr. Antonyuk, who has medical doctors as clients, can't tell him, you know, Ivan, we know you're a good guy, a decent guy and you carry a gun, come on over, it's specifically banned from doing this.

And like the *GeorgiaCarry* case about carrying in a church, New York has taken that off the table. New York says that you can't have -- you can't carry in any place of worship or religious observation. But what the court will not see is anything in here that says if you post a sign, you're okay. And you can't even go up to the person at the

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front door of the church like in <code>GeorgiaCarry</code> and say, hey, I've got a gun, is it okay if I come in here? And it's a little bit different in this case where the church doesn't care if you carry or where the church posts something that says you can't carry there. So, and I think that that -- the <code>GeorgiaCarry</code> person wanted to be able to carry in a church that was otherwise off limits and didn't want that there, and that's their right if they don't want it there. And the plaintiff, as you heard Mr. Antonyuk say earlier, he's not going to go -- if he's not wanted, he's not going to go there. And so I think that that case doesn't really help the defendants at all because you can't carry in New York in a church, period, end of story on September 1st.

He also discussed Judge, now Justice Amy Coney Barrett's dissent in the Kanter v. Barr case, and the fascinating thing about Justice Barrett is in that case she would have held, and she was in the dissent, but she would have held that nonviolent felons probably don't lose their gun rights, and that's not even the case we're making here, Judge, so what she was talking about when she said that dangerous people can be disarmed but they have to be dangerous. And luckily, the state has a way to find out if someone's dangerous without having to go into the social media stuff, they can run a NICS background check, they can go to the state police, they can say, Mr. Stamboulieh, where

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have you lived the last five years? I can say, oh, I lived in Mississippi, I spent some time in North Carolina, I lived overseas too, but you know, they can do some things without saying, Mr. Stamboulieh, let me look at your Twitter. that's another good point. What is social media? I have an idea of what it is, I'm sure the defendants have an idea of what it is, but it's going to depend on who we're talking to because I don't believe it's defined in the law. So is it only Twitter? Is it also my e-mails? Is it my posts on Reddit? If someone has an Onlyfans account, which I don't have, but if they did, are they going to have to put that up and then maybe the person looking at it is saying, well, I don't want this person to carry a gun, they're not dangerous but I just don't agree with selling naked pictures of myself online. So there's all kinds of different things that aren't defined well in this law that are only going to cause confusion and we believe are unconstitutional.

One thing I would say about the private property, that they don't have to post but they need express consent. That's kind of a little scary because if someone comes in only on the word of someone, you know, come in, I have a gun, you can come in, and then that person says, maybe you should leave now because you're carrying a gun, we're going to have a he said/she said versus -- on the word of I told them they could come in, I didn't tell him he could come in, and that

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just strikes me as something that we really shouldn't force people to have to go down those rabbit holes. It needs to be if you can't carry there, you can't carry there without this consent, express consent or whatever that means.

I would also say that the six states that are discussed in the Supreme Court case that had the heightening justifiable need in New Jersey, exceptional case requirement in Hawaii, it wasn't enough to hold the day, at the end of the day we have a right to public carry. So when we cherrypick these statutes, and I'm not saying that pejoratively, there's not a lot of them and so they picked the ones that they had that say you can't have a gun on someone's land in Texas in 1870 or you can't have a gun in someone else's land in New Jersey in 1720, these are very few places, very few states, colonies, what have you, that don't establish that it was a tradition that you couldn't carry onto someone else's property. And a lot of these statutes, as we briefed in our reply, look like they're antipoaching laws, it says you can't bring a killing device. Well, the people that write statutes now don't call them killing devices, and they don't call them killing devices in the CCIA, it's firearms and guns. So I think these are mostly antipoaching statutes versus something else.

There is one other group of individuals that are required to give social media and those are sex offenders.

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So there's a case that they cite in their brief, I believe it's the Doe case where it says that sex offenders have to provide identifiers, identifiers meaning what's your Twitter handle, some other identifiers I would guess like maybe IP The court in *Utah*, I think that was the case they cited, struck that statute as unconstitutional, as an invasion of the First Amendment. And then Utah went back and said, well, you don't really have to give us your passwords but if we are doing an investigation and we just happen to know you're a sex offender, you still have to provide us with the identifiers and the court at that point said, okay, it's okay because this quy's already convicted of a serious crime and what you're providing the police is material for an active investigation into child exploitation or some other type of crime like that. But so, you know, it's just weird being, as a gun owner being lumped in with a group of sex offenders that I have to turn over my social media.

I will say two other things. The traceability, it's not implemented yet, Judge, we're not saying that they're implementing it right now, there's no allegation that they're currently implementing it. When Ivan recertifies his permit, it's going to go to the superintendent of state police. One of the questions I wanted to ask defendant Bruen is about the training. Everything I've heard says that the training's not going to be even a thing until April of 2023

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and so on September 1st when people -- when other GOA members go to apply for their permit, there's no training that they can have because the superintendent has to come up with it. There's no training. And I guess we'll just have to see what comes out with that.

I'll answer the court what we're trying to do, we want to maintain the status quo. It does maintain, you know, we're asking to just maintain the status quo. Obviously we're post-Bruen right now so that is going to preclude the proper cause but all of the parade of horribles that the defendant has put forth in the briefing could happen right now because right now the CCIA is in effect. So all of these things that New York has been doing since the Sullivan Act, 1911 or '13, whichever date it was, has been this way since So the horrible things, the public safety, all of this extra stuff could have always happened in these past 110 years or however long it's been, and just now it's an emergency for them to pass something without going through all the procedural stuff that I don't really know, but to put this in to further restrict people's carry, and we're just asking for status quo and we only need a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we don't need to be certain that we're going to win. But we need a substantial likelihood and I think that we've provided that to the court in the briefing, your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Okay, sir.

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MR. STAMBOULIEH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. And brief reply.

MR. THOMPSON: Very brief, your Honor. Three points, hopefully I'll be out within two minutes. First of which, Mr. Stamboulieh is correct that the recertification does go to New York State Police, this is the website that Mr. Antonyuk talked about where you input your information, but there's no harm alleged from the recertification process. That doesn't carry with it any of the consequences that the plaintiffs are talking about. There's no social media check, no interview, there's no harm from recertification.

Number two, the plaintiffs discuss our historical antecedents on property and sort of deride them as antipoaching laws. I don't think that that's something that is a valid reading of these laws, they are not so limited.

And number three, and this is sort of an overarching point that I think touches on the standing issues, touches on the facial standard, and touches on the merits as well. These hypotheticals that we've gone backwards and forwards on, could Mr. Antonyuk be arrested for bringing a gun here versus there, could there be assembling, could they, you know, could a licensing officer require a fingernail test, that's in their brief, all of this is the point of the difference between a facial and an as-applied

challenge. There are going to be enforcement decisions that 1 2 are made about whether and how to enforce this statute and 3 whether and how to do that in a reasonable way or in a potentially unconstitutional way, and part of the reason we 4 have as-applied challenges rather than facial challenges is 6 so that courts adjudicate the statute as it actually is, and 7 not as we lawyers put in our hypotheticals. And because there is a plainly legitimate sweep to these statutes because 8 9 they are grounded in American history and doctrine, we ask 10 that the injunction be denied. Thank you, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. That will conclude 12 our hearing. And I'm assuming, plaintiff's counsel, that 13 based on our earlier discussions and your argument, you no 14 longer are requesting the appearance of Superintendent Bruen? 15 MR. STAMBOULIEH: That's correct, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So then we'll take 17 what we have and we'll get a decision out to you. Okay. 18 MR. STAMBOULIEH: Thank you, your Honor. 19 Thank you, your Honor. MR. THOMPSON: 20 THE COURT: Thank you. Have a good day. 21 THE CLERK: Court's adjourned. 2.2 (Court Adjourned, 12:24 p.m.) 23 24 2.5

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4	I, JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR, Federal
5	Official Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the
6	United States District Court for the Northern
7	District of New York, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that
8	pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States
9	Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct
10	transcript of the stenographically reported
11	proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and
12	that the transcript page format is in conformance
13	with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of
14	the United States.
15	
16	Dated this 24th day of August, 2022.
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18	
19	/S/ JODI L. HIBBARD
20	JODI L. HIBBARD, RPR, CRR, CSR Official U.S. Court Reporter
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